WGO's ability to outperform the S&P by 8–9 percentage points across all recent horizons underscores its defensive positioning within the cyclical RV sector, suggesting a potential upside if consumer confidence rebounds faster than broader equities.
The cumulative 19.1% one‑year decline, still less severe than the S&P's 42.7% drop, signals that a sharp macro shock (e.g., sustained high interest rates or fuel price spikes) could compress discretionary spending further and erode WGO's outperformance margin, posing a near‑term downside risk of another double‑digit pullback.
The apparent >100% institutional ownership implies heavy use of derivatives or short exposure; a coordinated unwind could amplify volatility and precipitate a sharper sell‑off than the historical max drawdown suggests.
The most striking growth signal is the sustained double‑digit negative CAGR (-17.4%) over three years, which erodes the base for any future earnings momentum and forces investors to question whether the current product mix or market positioning can reverse this steep decline.
The critical margin risk is the razor‑thin net profit margin of 0.9%; a 1 pp decline in gross margin or a $30 M rise in SG&A would push net earnings into negative territory, jeopardizing cash flow and dividend sustainability.
The most striking profitability signal is the 78% drop in net profit margin, which alone accounts for roughly two-thirds of the ROE decline and signals that the business model is currently unable to convert revenue into earnings efficiently.
| Year | ROE% | Margin% | Turnover | Leverage | ROIC% | ROCE% | ROA% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 1.24 | 1.85 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 1.1 |
| 2024 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 1.25 | 1.87 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 0.5 |
| 2023 | 15.8 | 6.2 | 1.39 | 1.84 | 15.1 | 14.2 | 8.6 |
| 2022 | 30.9 | 7.9 | 2.00 | 1.97 | 31.6 | 29.8 | 15.7 |
| 2021 | 26.7 | 7.8 | 1.72 | 2.00 | 25.3 | 23.9 | 13.3 |
| 2020 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 1.34 | 2.12 | 8.3 | 7.8 | 3.5 |
| 2019 | 17.7 | 5.6 | 1.80 | 1.75 | 17.8 | 17.1 | 10.1 |
| 2018 | 19.2 | 5.1 | 1.92 | 1.97 | 19.8 | 18.9 | 9.7 |
| 2017 | 16.1 | 4.6 | 1.71 | 2.04 | 18.1 | 17.0 | 7.9 |
| 2016 | 17.0 | 4.7 | 2.50 | 1.46 | 26.9 | 22.1 | 11.6 |
| 2015 | 18.7 | 4.2 | 2.70 | 1.64 | 26.6 | 21.2 | 11.4 |
The narrow ROIC margin of ~0.2% above cost of capital quantifies a thin economic moat; any further margin compression or asset base expansion could push ROIC below cost of capital, eroding shareholder value and potentially forcing deleveraging actions.
| Year | Total Asset Days | Inventory Days | Receivables Days | Fixed Asset Days | Payables Days | Cash Conversion Cycle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 295 | 59 | 26 | 50 | 19 | 66 |
| 2024 | 293 | 63 | 23 | 47 | 21 | 65 |
| 2023 | 263 | 59 | 20 | 40 | 18 | 60 |
| 2022 | 183 | 48 | 19 | 23 | 20 | 47 |
| 2021 | 213 | 42 | 26 | 22 | 22 | 45 |
| 2020 | 272 | 33 | 34 | 32 | 24 | 43 |
| 2019 | 203 | 44 | 29 | 23 | 18 | 55 |
| 2018 | 190 | 41 | 30 | 18 | 17 | 54 |
| 2017 | 213 | 39 | 29 | 17 | 22 | 47 |
| 2016 | 146 | 52 | 25 | 21 | 19 | 58 |
| 2015 | 135 | 47 | 25 | 14 | 14 | 58 |
| Year | Total Assets | Total Liabilities | Total Equity | Total Debt | Net Debt | Cash | Current Assets | Current Liabilities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $2265M | $1040M | $1225M | $595M | $421M | $174M | $792M | $327M |
| 2024 | $2384M | $1111M | $1273M | $742M | $411M | $331M | $989M | $405M |
| 2023 | $2512M | $1144M | $1368M | $649M | $339M | $310M | $997M | $396M |
| 2022 | $2483M | $1220M | $1263M | $599M | $316M | $282M | $1094M | $522M |
| 2021 | $2115M | $1058M | $1057M | $564M | $129M | $435M | $1059M | $407M |
| 2020 | $1754M | $927M | $827M | $548M | $255M | $293M | $714M | $300M |
| 2019 | $1104M | $472M | $632M | $254M | $217M | $37M | $411M | $198M |
| 2018 | $1052M | $517M | $534M | $291M | $289M | $2M | $372M | $204M |
| 2017 | $903M | $461M | $442M | $275M | $239M | $36M | $314M | $167M |
| 2016 | $391M | $122M | $268M | $-86M | $86M | $281M | $93M | |
| 2015 | $362M | $141M | $221M | $-70M | $70M | $266M | $82M |
| Year | Operating CF | Investing CF | Financing CF | CapEx | Free Cash Flow | Buybacks | Dividends |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $129M | $-35M | $-251M | $-39M | $90M | $-54M | $-39M |
| 2024 | $144M | $-46M | $-77M | $-45M | $99M | $-74M | $-37M |
| 2023 | $294M | $-170M | $-97M | $-83M | $211M | $-55M | $-33M |
| 2022 | $401M | $-316M | $-237M | $-88M | $313M | $-214M | $-24M |
| 2021 | $237M | $-33M | $-62M | $-45M | $192M | $-48M | $-16M |
| 2020 | $270M | $-293M | $278M | $-32M | $238M | $-2M | $-15M |
| 2019 | $134M | $-39M | $-60M | $-41M | $93M | $-8M | $-14M |
| 2018 | $83M | $-112M | $-5M | $-29M | $55M | $-6M | $-13M |
| 2017 | $97M | $-405M | $259M | $-14M | $83M | $-2M | $-13M |
| 2016 | $53M | $-23M | $-14M | $-25M | $28M | $-3M | $-11M |
| 2015 | $45M | $-17M | $-16M | $-17M | $29M | $-7M | $-10M |
This report is generated by Finexus and is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security.
The analysis is based on publicly available data from sources believed to be reliable, but Finexus does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. Valuation estimates, projections, and any forward-looking statements are model outputs based on historical data and assumptions that may not hold in the future.
Past performance is not indicative of future results. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decision. Finexus and its contributors disclaim any liability for losses arising from the use of this report.
Created 2026-06-08 · finexus.net