The three‑month return of +46.5%, beating the S&P by 8 points, is the standout because it captures the impact of SPNS's recent pricing uplift and new enterprise deals, signaling that the company can generate rapid earnings acceleration in a relatively short horizon.
While long‑term returns are strong, the five‑year CAGR of only +11.7% signals a slowdown from the three‑year pace; if ARR growth falls below 12% YoY, earnings could miss consensus and the stock may revert toward its historical flat return, eroding the premium over the S&P.
A potential red flag is the -1.15% recent institutional outflow; if this trend accelerates beyond 2-3% weekly, it could signal emerging concerns about earnings sustainability or sector headwinds, pressuring price support levels.
The combination of a 5.4% YoY revenue rise with a 13.3% net margin demonstrates that Sapiens is converting top‑line gains into disproportionately higher bottom‑line results, reinforcing the thesis that its shift toward high‑margin SaaS offerings is materially enhancing shareholder value.
The gross margin margin floor could be tested if the mix shifts back toward on‑premise licensing; a 5% swing toward lower‑margin services would cut gross profit by roughly $27 million, pressuring operating leverage and potentially shrinking net margins below 10%.
Margin growth of 2.5 points—driven by higher software subscription fees and lower implementation costs—has been the key catalyst for ROE acceleration, underscoring Sapiens' successful shift toward a recurring‑revenue model that enhances profitability stability.
| Year | ROE% | Margin% | Turnover | Leverage | ROIC% | ROCE% | ROA% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 15.0 | 13.3 | 0.78 | 1.44 | 16.5 | 15.8 | 10.4 |
| 2023 | 14.0 | 12.1 | 0.75 | 1.54 | 15.2 | 14.6 | 9.1 |
| 2022 | 13.1 | 11.1 | 0.71 | 1.66 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 7.9 |
| 2021 | 11.6 | 10.2 | 0.64 | 1.76 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 6.6 |
| 2020 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 0.54 | 1.87 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 4.7 |
| 2019 | 11.7 | 8.1 | 0.72 | 2.02 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 5.8 |
| 2018 | 6.8 | 4.8 | 0.76 | 1.87 | 8.0 | 7.7 | 3.6 |
| 2017 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.73 | 1.85 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| 2016 | 9.9 | 8.9 | 0.84 | 1.33 | 13.5 | 11.8 | 7.5 |
| 2015 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 0.77 | 1.33 | 15.8 | 12.5 | 8.3 |
The equity multiplier’s increase to 1.44x raises debt‑to‑equity exposure; if interest rates climb or credit conditions tighten, financing costs could erode ROIC and pressure cash flow margins.
| Year | Total Asset Days | Inventory Days | Receivables Days | Fixed Asset Days | Payables Days | Cash Conversion Cycle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 465 | 0 | 67 | 21 | 10 | 57 |
| 2023 | 489 | 0 | 64 | 26 | 8 | 56 |
| 2022 | 513 | 0 | 72 | 35 | 13 | 44 |
| 2021 | 566 | 0 | 60 | 46 | 7 | 35 |
| 2020 | 681 | 0 | 62 | 68 | 9 | 54 |
| 2019 | 507 | 0 | 56 | 74 | 10 | 46 |
| 2018 | 477 | 0 | 75 | 11 | 12 | 62 |
| 2017 | 503 | 0 | 72 | 15 | 15 | 44 |
| 2016 | 435 | 0 | 59 | 17 | 18 | 40 |
| 2015 | 476 | 0 | 69 | 11 | 15 | 54 |
| Year | Total Assets | Total Liabilities | Total Equity | Total Debt | Net Debt | Cash | Current Assets | Current Liabilities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | $692M | $212M | $480M | $64M | $-100M | $164M | $335M | $150M |
| 2023 | $690M | $240M | $447M | $87M | $-40M | $127M | $315M | $149M |
| 2022 | $667M | $265M | $401M | $117M | $-44M | $160M | $285M | $146M |
| 2021 | $715M | $306M | $407M | $148M | $-42M | $190M | $300M | $152M |
| 2020 | $714M | $330M | $382M | $177M | $25M | $153M | $267M | $145M |
| 2019 | $452M | $227M | $224M | $120M | $54M | $66M | $147M | $105M |
| 2018 | $379M | $176M | $202M | $78M | $14M | $65M | $130M | $81M |
| 2017 | $371M | $170M | $201M | $78M | $7M | $71M | $131M | $70M |
| 2016 | $258M | $63M | $194M | $15M | $-46M | $61M | $120M | $48M |
| 2015 | $242M | $60M | $182M | $13M | $-41M | $54M | $98M | $47M |
| Year | Operating CF | Investing CF | Financing CF | CapEx | Free Cash Flow | Buybacks | Dividends |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | $82M | $13M | $-56M | $-3M | $79M | $-32M | |
| 2023 | $79M | $-73M | $-43M | $-9M | $70M | $-28M | |
| 2022 | $44M | $-12M | $-58M | $-9M | $35M | $-39M | |
| 2021 | $81M | $0M | $-40M | $-12M | $69M | $-2M | $-20M |
| 2020 | $58M | $-115M | $157M | $-11M | $47M | $-7M | |
| 2019 | $66M | $-42M | $-21M | $-17M | $49M | $-1M | $-11M |
| 2018 | $28M | $-26M | $-9M | $-7M | $21M | $-10M | |
| 2017 | $9M | $-76M | $70M | $-8M | $1M | $-10M | |
| 2016 | $26M | $-8M | $-11M | $-10M | $16M | $-10M | |
| 2015 | $40M | $-19M | $-14M | $-9M | $32M | $-7M |
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The analysis is based on publicly available data from sources believed to be reliable, but Finexus does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. Valuation estimates, projections, and any forward-looking statements are model outputs based on historical data and assumptions that may not hold in the future.
Past performance is not indicative of future results. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decision. Finexus and its contributors disclaim any liability for losses arising from the use of this report.
Created 2026-06-08 · finexus.net