The 1‑year total return of +3.0% starkly contrasts with the S&P's -20.6%, demonstrating that REYN delivered positive absolute gains while the market plunged, underscoring its potential as an outperformance play in a bearish environment.
Despite relative outperformance, the cumulative -4.2% three‑year annualized decline signals underlying earnings pressure; if consumer discretionary spending weakens further, REYN could see accelerated share price erosion, potentially widening the gap to the S&P's -24.7% loss and amplifying downside risk.
The slight institutional outflow (-1.43%) combined with an RSI near 70 quantifies a divergence: insiders are bullish while some institutions are trimming exposure, which could signal upcoming profit‑taking pressure if the stock fails to break higher.
The combination of flat revenue growth (0.70% YoY) and stable EPS demonstrates that Reynolds is currently relying on margin preservation rather than top‑line expansion to sustain earnings, a dynamic that could limit upside unless new growth catalysts emerge.
The net margin of 8.1% leaves limited cushion against any cost inflation; a 100‑basis‑point rise in commodity input costs would cut net income by roughly $37 M (≈1.0% of revenue), pressuring earnings and potentially triggering dividend cuts.
Margin expansion to 8.1%—a 5.4‑point jump—has been the dominant catalyst for ROE growth, demonstrating that Reynolds can lift earnings without relying on additional capital or leverage, a strong tailwind for shareholders.
| Year | ROE% | Margin% | Turnover | Leverage | ROIC% | ROCE% | ROA% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 13.4 | 8.1 | 0.75 | 2.19 | 11.4 | 11.3 | 6.1 |
| 2024 | 16.4 | 9.5 | 0.76 | 2.27 | 12.8 | 12.7 | 7.2 |
| 2023 | 15.0 | 7.9 | 0.78 | 2.44 | 12.1 | 11.8 | 6.2 |
| 2022 | 13.8 | 6.8 | 0.77 | 2.64 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 5.2 |
| 2021 | 18.5 | 9.1 | 0.74 | 2.74 | 11.1 | 11.0 | 6.7 |
| 2020 | 22.5 | 11.1 | 0.68 | 2.96 | 13.7 | 13.5 | 7.6 |
| 2019 | -27.5 | 7.4 | 0.72 | -5.16 | 13.5 | 13.3 | 5.3 |
| 2018 | -17.1 | 5.6 | 0.49 | -6.25 | 19.5 | 10.2 | 2.7 |
| 2017 | -23.3 | 10.2 | 0.50 | -4.55 | 37.8 | 5.1 | |
| 2016 | 2.7 | 0.0 |
The CCC of 61 days, while improved, still exceeds the industry median of ~45 days; an additional 16‑day lag could tie up roughly $30 million in working capital at current sales levels, pressuring liquidity if demand slows.
| Year | Total Asset Days | Inventory Days | Receivables Days | Fixed Asset Days | Payables Days | Cash Conversion Cycle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 484 | 76 | 36 | 90 | 50 | 61 |
| 2024 | 481 | 76 | 35 | 84 | 43 | 68 |
| 2023 | 469 | 68 | 35 | 77 | 33 | 70 |
| 2022 | 471 | 87 | 35 | 75 | 36 | 86 |
| 2021 | 494 | 78 | 35 | 75 | 35 | 78 |
| 2020 | 534 | 67 | 35 | 75 | 36 | 65 |
| 2019 | 508 | 71 | 4 | 70 | 35 | 40 |
| 2018 | 746 | 68 | 7 | 54 | 64 | 11 |
| 2017 | 730 | 65 | 10 | 52 | 64 | 11 |
| 2016 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Year | Total Assets | Total Liabilities | Total Equity | Total Debt | Net Debt | Cash | Current Assets | Current Liabilities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $4936M | $2683M | $2253M | $1765M | $1618M | $147M | $1116M | $577M |
| 2024 | $4873M | $2731M | $2142M | $1794M | $1657M | $137M | $1101M | $539M |
| 2023 | $4829M | $2846M | $1983M | $1906M | $1791M | $115M | $1041M | $478M |
| 2022 | $4929M | $3061M | $1868M | $2169M | $2131M | $38M | $1171M | $496M |
| 2021 | $4812M | $3056M | $1756M | $2169M | $2005M | $164M | $1104M | $484M |
| 2020 | $4773M | $3158M | $1615M | $2297M | $1985M | $312M | $1053M | $432M |
| 2019 | $4223M | $5041M | $-818M | $4268M | $4166M | $102M | $570M | $378M |
| 2018 | $6421M | $7448M | $-1027M | $5980M | $5957M | $23M | $516M | $1385M |
| 2017 | $5911M | $7209M | $-1298M | $5976M | $5953M | $23M | $487M | $4482M |
| 2016 |
| Year | Operating CF | Investing CF | Financing CF | CapEx | Free Cash Flow | Buybacks | Dividends |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $477M | $-161M | $-306M | $-161M | $316M | $-192M | |
| 2024 | $489M | $-120M | $-346M | $-120M | $369M | $-192M | |
| 2023 | $644M | $-110M | $-457M | $-104M | $540M | $-192M | |
| 2022 | $219M | $-128M | $-217M | $-128M | $91M | $-192M | |
| 2021 | $310M | $-141M | $-317M | $-141M | $169M | $-192M | |
| 2020 | $319M | $-143M | $34M | $-143M | $176M | $-124M | |
| 2019 | $403M | $-128M | $-196M | $-109M | $294M | ||
| 2018 | $530M | $-554M | $24M | $-82M | $448M | ||
| 2017 | $395M | $-364M | $-40M | $-56M | $339M | ||
| 2016 | $393M | $-584M | $180M | $-43M | $350M |
This report is generated by Finexus and is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security.
The analysis is based on publicly available data from sources believed to be reliable, but Finexus does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. Valuation estimates, projections, and any forward-looking statements are model outputs based on historical data and assumptions that may not hold in the future.
Past performance is not indicative of future results. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decision. Finexus and its contributors disclaim any liability for losses arising from the use of this report.
Created 2026-06-07 · finexus.net