ALIT's three‑month relative outperformance (-22.1% vs -31.6% S&P) is noteworthy because it shows the stock can hold its ground when market pressure intensifies, implying underlying fundamentals may be more robust than peers.
The cumulative 86.5% one‑year plunge—far exceeding the S&P's 110.1% decline—highlights extreme volatility; investors must beware that any further earnings miss or macro shock could trigger another steep sell‑off, eroding remaining capital quickly.
The near‑total institutional dominance also creates a concentration risk: if any of the major holders reallocate out of ALIT, even a modest 5% reduction could trigger a cascade of sell orders and widen the already severe max drawdown potential.
The key growth insight is the contrast between a near‑flat three‑year CAGR (0.8%) and the current 3% YoY revenue decline, implying that recent market or client attrition is pulling down results faster than historical trends would predict, which could signal an inflection point if not addressed.
The primary margin concern is the -136.9% net margin, which means the company loses roughly $3.2 B for every $2.3 B of revenue; such a loss ratio cannot be sustained and would require either significant cost cuts or a sharp revenue rebound to bring net profitability into positive territory.
The plunge to -136.9% operating margin is the primary driver of a collapsing ROE, flagging an urgent need for cost‑control measures; without reversing this trend, shareholder returns will remain negative despite any asset efficiency gains.
| Year | ROE% | Margin% | Turnover | Leverage | ROIC% | ROCE% | ROA% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | -296.6 | -136.9 | 0.50 | 4.38 | 1.0 | 0.9 | -67.8 |
| 2024 | -3.6 | -6.7 | 0.28 | 1.90 | -1.3 | -1.2 | -1.9 |
| 2023 | -7.7 | -10.1 | 0.32 | 2.42 | -1.2 | -1.2 | -3.2 |
| 2022 | -1.4 | -2.8 | 0.20 | 2.53 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -0.6 |
| 2021 | -1.4 | -2.1 | 0.27 | 2.65 | 2.3 | 2.2 | -0.5 |
| 2020 | -15.1 | -3.8 | 0.39 | 10.18 | 3.0 | 2.8 | -1.5 |
| 2019 | 2.7 | 0.9 | 0.39 | 8.18 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 0.3 |
| 2018 | -2.6 | -0.9 | 0.42 | 6.95 | 4.8 | 4.6 | -0.4 |
| 2017 | 2.7 | 1.0 | 0.37 | 7.05 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 0.4 |
| 2016 | 5.6 | 0.0 |
With ROIC at 1.0% versus an estimated WACC of ~7.5%, Alight is destroying shareholder value; sustained underperformance could force deleveraging or asset sales, further pressuring earnings and liquidity.
| Year | Total Asset Days | Inventory Days | Receivables Days | Fixed Asset Days | Payables Days | Cash Conversion Cycle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 737 | 0 | 62 | 61 | 52 | 11 |
| 2024 | 1282 | 0 | 88 | 62 | 84 | 3 |
| 2023 | 1154 | 0 | 86 | 47 | 71 | 15 |
| 2022 | 1858 | 0 | 137 | 67 | 122 | 15 |
| 2021 | 1376 | 0 | 83 | 45 | 67 | 16 |
| 2020 | 931 | 0 | 75 | 62 | 76 | -0 |
| 2019 | 942 | 0 | 95 | 60 | 89 | 7 |
| 2018 | 872 | 0 | 78 | 35 | 82 | -4 |
| 2017 | 993 | 0 | 89 | 24 | 79 | 10 |
| 2016 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Year | Total Assets | Total Liabilities | Total Equity | Total Debt | Net Debt | Cash | Current Assets | Current Liabilities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $4568M | $3522M | $1044M | $2005M | $1732M | $273M | $1142M | $874M |
| 2024 | $8193M | $3880M | $4309M | $2156M | $1813M | $343M | $1267M | $892M |
| 2023 | $10782M | $6040M | $4462M | $2918M | $2560M | $358M | $2776M | $2187M |
| 2022 | $11235M | $6146M | $4439M | $3003M | $2753M | $250M | $2816M | $2348M |
| 2021 | $10988M | $6060M | $4140M | $3112M | $2740M | $372M | $2469M | $2125M |
| 2020 | $6956M | $6273M | $683M | $4361M | $3855M | $506M | $2231M | $1785M |
| 2019 | $6586M | $5781M | $805M | $4059M | $3841M | $218M | $1775M | $1545M |
| 2018 | $5682M | $4864M | $818M | $3464M | $3244M | $220M | $1524M | $1249M |
| 2017 | $6257M | $5370M | $887M | $3455M | $3259M | $196M | $2069M | $1760M |
| 2016 |
| Year | Operating CF | Investing CF | Financing CF | CapEx | Free Cash Flow | Buybacks | Dividends |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | $360M | $-123M | $-298M | $-110M | $250M | $-65M | $-86M |
| 2024 | $252M | $836M | $-1074M | $-121M | $131M | $-167M | $-21M |
| 2023 | $386M | $-159M | $-231M | $-140M | $246M | $-40M | |
| 2022 | $286M | $-235M | $54M | $-148M | $138M | $-12M | |
| 2021 | $115M | $-1907M | $2336M | $-114M | $1M | $-144M | |
| 2020 | $233M | $-142M | $463M | $-90M | $143M | $-3M | |
| 2019 | $268M | $-604M | $420M | $-77M | $191M | $-4M | $-10M |
| 2018 | $196M | $-130M | $-538M | $-80M | $116M | ||
| 2017 | $303M | $-4303M | $4194M | $-57M | $246M | $-399M | $-69M |
| 2016 | $388M | $-75M | $-311M | $-77M | $311M | $-308M |
This report is generated by Finexus and is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security.
The analysis is based on publicly available data from sources believed to be reliable, but Finexus does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. Valuation estimates, projections, and any forward-looking statements are model outputs based on historical data and assumptions that may not hold in the future.
Past performance is not indicative of future results. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decision. Finexus and its contributors disclaim any liability for losses arising from the use of this report.
Created 2026-06-07 · finexus.net